Two lessons for carbon markets from the sovereign debt market
By Chris Canavan, CEO
The advent of Article 6, whose rule book was finally agreed at the Baku climate summit in 2024, has forced national governments to set up carbon registries if they want to avail themselves of the carbon markets and unlock the billions of dollars they need to fund mitigation projects. Article 6 offers them three paths: they can build their own registry, use the UN’s centralized international registry, or rely on one operated by another party. The choice is theirs.
Since Baku, ministers holding climate portfolios have wrestled with a nettlesome question: Should we outsource our registry infrastructure – to independent crediting programs or the UN – or must we control it ourselves?
Lurking behind this question is a challenge that is as old as international capital mobility itself: how to balance two imperatives that pull in opposite directions. One is the political imperative to preserve sovereign rights – in this case, over projects, data, enforcement mechanisms, and the authority to decide what counts as a legitimate credit. Pulling against this is the financial imperative to attract foreign buyers and lenders, who worry that a government might trample on their rights by invoking its sovereign prerogative.
A climate minister tasked with seizing the Article 6 opportunity could be forgiven for feeling daunted by such a dilemma – one involving political sovereignty, the law, and financial infrastructure – with no helpful precedent to learn from. But there are helpful precedents, and they can be found in the history of the international sovereign debt market.
A century and a half ago, the market for sovereign bonds – bonds issued by governments to borrow from international investors – was one that pitted borrowing governments jealously asserting their sovereign rights against lending countries (the financial centers in Europe and the US) who believed that might makes right. It was against this polarized backdrop that German and British warships blockaded Venezuelan ports in 1902 to press debt claims, and Theodore Roosevelt responded by declaring that the US could act as an “international police power” over Latin American governments that defaulted.
Today, sovereign debt disputes are almost always resolved in courts and arbitration panels. These adjudicating bodies are almost always outside the borrowing country (say, in London or the US). And borrowing governments acknowledge the authority of foreign jurisdictions without putting their sovereignty at risk. That’s because in the decades since the heyday of gunboat diplomacy, borrowing governments and foreign lenders have developed ways to balance the political and financial imperatives. The balance isn’t perfect. But thanks to this balance, sovereign bond markets move trillions of dollars.
There are billions of dollars awaiting host governments that take full advantage of Article 6. These governments could decide it is safest to build Article 6 carbon market infrastructure behind the high walls of sovereign immunity. But this seemingly safe decision could be very risky. The risk isn’t the arrival of gunboats; those days are long gone. But if governments require buyers and investors to rely on unfamiliar legal jurisdictions, dispute-settlement venues, and infrastructure, and if they reserve for themselves the full prerogatives of sovereignty, they might cut themselves off from buyers and investors who are eager to deploy capital to mitigation but wary of subjecting themselves to jurisdictions they understand poorly. We might get only a trickle of the billions of climate mitigation dollars we desperately need.
A safer decision would be for ministers with climate portfolios to walk down the street to consult with their finance ministry peers about how the sovereign bond markets work. Here are two lessons I think they would learn.
Lesson one: Sovereignty should have exceptions
The founding doctrine of sovereign debt was legal nationalism. The Calvo Doctrine, articulated by the Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo in the 1860s, established the principle of absolute sovereignty: investment disputes should be resolved exclusively in the courts of the country where the investment was made. Foreign investors should not be allowed to run home for legal, much less diplomatic, or even less, military backing.
But a government whose obligations were adjudicated only in its own courts, under its own law, and subject to change at its own convenience, could not borrow cheaply, and might find gunboats in its harbors following a missed debt payment. Absolute sovereignty came at a price.
Yet what eventually made sovereign bonds a deep, liquid asset class was not the wholesale abandonment of sovereignty. It was a precise and narrow qualification: sovereign bond contracts today are designed to specify governing law (typically New York or English) for that contract only; and this is accompanied by sovereign immunity waivers that apply only to the specific obligation and nothing else. The borrowing government keeps its sovereign immunity in general while waiving it for this contract alone.
Host countries designing Article 6 frameworks face the same choice. A government that insists that its authorized credits must sit on a registry in its jurisdiction, be subject to its law, and that reserves unlimited discretion over whether to revoke authorizations, is unwittingly invoking Calvo; buyers and investors will respond as nineteenth-century bondholders did, by demanding high risk premiums or by staying away altogether.
But the alternative shouldn’t be and doesn’t have to be a complete surrender of sovereignty over climate action; this would be inconsistent with the spirit and structure of the Paris Agreement, and it is unnecessary. Governments can and should retain control of how they use carbon markets, what they choose to authorize, and any levies they wish to apply; they should expect projects to comply with local law. Instead of giving up this control, the government can commit narrowly and specifically to permitting legal title, claims, and disputes to be adjudicable somewhere the buyer and investors understand and trust.
Governments that issue bonds subject to, for example, English law and the London Court of International Arbitration don’t take this as a vote of no confidence in their local laws and courts, nor do they see it as a capitulation of sovereignty. They have come to accept that institutional bond investors that lend to governments around the world will be much less forthcoming if they must become experts on the local jurisdictions of every country they lend to. Governments have also come to learn that they can waive just enough sovereignty to attract investors without surrendering their sovereignty altogether.
Lesson two: Sovereignty is encoded in the infrastructure
The legal history of sovereign debt gets the attention, but the market plumbing’s history is just as important, and just as relevant to carbon markets.
Over many decades, stock and bond markets have built depositories and clearing systems, such as Euroclear and Clearstream in Europe and the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) in the United States, that determine where a bond legally “lives,” who maintains the definitive record of who owns it, and under which rules it changes hands. This infrastructure moves trillions of dollars a year.
Governments that issue sovereign bonds rely on this infrastructure. They may maintain their own ledgers to keep track of how many bonds they’ve issued and what obligations they have to bondholders to service this debt; they’re required to report this information to the International Monetary Fund. But for basic market functions, like moving bond ownership from one account to another, governments rely on international infrastructure that they do not control.
To understand how governments have gotten comfortable with this arrangement, it is important to note that Euroclear (to use one example) keeps track of who owns a bond, but it does not adjudicate disputes over the bonds’ legitimacy.
This distinction is critical. The history of the sovereign bond market is replete with disputes between governments and their bondholders. Almost every government default has led to high drama in court. Some of these disputes have taken complicated turns. In 2000, the Argentine government considered refusing to honor debt obligations it could trace to the military juntas, arguing that these governments were “odious” and illegitimate (they were) and so were the debt claims they took on and passed on to successor democratic governments. Similar claims were made about Iraq’s debt after Saddam, and in Ukraine after Yanukovych fled to Moscow. Even more frequently, there have been high-octane disputes over whether foreign bondholders should be treated better than domestic bondholders.
These disputes have been adjudicated in court and by diplomats. They have not been adjudicated by the depositories (like Euroclear) that housed the bonds. Indeed, depositories have worked hard to stay out of these disputes to protect their neutrality, a pillar of their reliability. To put pressure on defaulting governments, bondholders have occasionally attempted to force Euroclear and DTCC to take sides by, for example, blocking payments to other creditors until the government has paid the aggrieved bondholders. Sometimes these tactics have worked. But Euroclear, its peers, and the governments that regulate them have fought back fiercely to protect their neutrality.
That’s important. Governments that issue sovereign bonds don’t count on infrastructure providers like Euroclear to testify on their behalf. But they don’t want them to aid and abet the other side. Neutrality, and the will to fight assiduously to preserve neutrality, is why governments feel comfortable relying on this infrastructure.
In the carbon markets, standards bodies like Verra and Gold Standard perform two distinct functions that get conflated. They decide on a carbon credit’s legitimacy – whether it represents real, additional, permanent mitigation; this is the indispensable role of independent standards bodies. They also record who owns which unit, a role they play by necessity rather than because they want to, and for which at least some standards bodies offer no guarantee under their terms of use. The very same institution that controls the record also judges the record’s legitimacy.
This conflation makes some host governments uneasy, which again comes with precedent. In the sovereign bond market, governments avoid infrastructure that could turn against them. That’s why there is a separation between neutral title infrastructure (e.g., Euroclear) that everyone can rely on, and separate venues (e.g., courts, arbitration panels, diplomatic deal-making) that determine legitimacy when it is disputed.
Article 6 and compliance markets need the same separation. To be trusted by host countries, buyers, and investors, registry infrastructure where credits are recorded and transferred must be neutral and safely insulated from disputes over the validity of credits, whether they should be reversed or cancelled, or if the proper authorizations are in place.
Borrow this playbook
Nearly every doctrine and institution that makes the sovereign bond market work was built over decades. Each improvement was often in the wake of a crisis. The 1902 Venezuela blockade set in motion the demise of gunboat diplomacy and the ascendancy of resolving disputes in court. The hundreds of sovereign bond disputes adjudicated since then have filled out the architecture of this market. It remains flawed and incomplete. But it sustains nearly $2 trillion in emerging-market sovereign bonds, a testament to its evolution over a century and a half.
Carbon markets don’t have a century and a half to get it right. That’s the bad news.
The good news is that the lessons that the ministries exploring Article 6 will need to learn have already been learned by the finance ministries down the street. The playbook is in the finance ministry’s archives, waiting to be borrowed.